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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintitt/Appellant 
Case No. 860084 
vs. 
THE ESTATE OF GILBERT KIMBALL 
and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Detendants/Appe Hants, 
MEL FLETCHER and 
PEGGY FLETCHER, 
Detendants/Respondents. 
THE ESTATE OF GILBERT KIMBALL 
ana MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintitts/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MELVIN FLETCHER and 
PEGGY FLETCHER, 
COUNTERCROSS CLAIMANTS 
and RESPONDENTS. 
* * * * * * * * * 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court abrogate its judicial 
responsibility by allowing respondents to alter the findings ot 
the Court and partition the real estate contrary to the Court's 
ruling? 
2. Are the claims ot Sweeney and Fletchers barred by the 
Doctrine ot Laches for their failure to assert any claim in the 
Kimball parcel £or 40 years or by the Statute ot Limitations, § 
78-12-2 et seq., U.C.A. (1953) for failure to commence an action 
within seven years? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Are the claims ot Sweeneys and Fletchers otherwise 
barred by the Doctrine ot Adverse Possession pursuant to §78-12-
10 U.C.A. (1953, amended)? 
4. is the claim of Fletchers to any Kimball property barred 
by estoppel arising trom the predecessor's disclaimer of any 
interest in the property in the probate proceeding or for lack of 
any consideration paid by Fletchers for any interest in the 
Kimball property? 
5. Does a party have an absolute privilege to disparage 
another's title if the parties are involved in litigation and the 
recorded document is not authorized nor permitted by law? 
6. Is it error to award property claimed by one party to 
another litigant when that litigant has expressly waived any 
interest in the property and stated to the Court that no interest 
was claimed? 
7. Are the findings and conclusions of the Court so 
ambiguous and confused as to require that this matter be 
remanded? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal trom a final judgment quieting title to 
several parcels ot contiguous property located in Park City and 
partitioning that property among tne litigants (R. pp 382-387). 
In its ruling, the District Court awarded the property as 
set forth on Page 4 herein (R. p 439, Addendum). In the written 
Judgment prepared by the Respondent, the ruling was changed and 
the ownership ot the property redistributed without leave or 
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request ot Court (R. pp 395-397, Addendum). The discrepancy 
between the Court's ruling and the Judgment is demonstrated on 
the diagram on the following page. 
The Plaintiffs, Sweeney Land Company, originally brought 
this action aganst Fletchers to quiet title to a 30 foot strip of 
property lying between the site of the old Coalition Bulding in 
Park City (now the site of the Town Lift) (R. pp 1-3). 
Subsequently the Kimballs were joined as party detendants to 
resolve asserted claims to their property which lie south and 
east of the original parcel and include what is designated as the 
Kimball parcel and the small piece know as the Hershiser 
parcel. The locations ot these properties are set forth on the 
diagram attached on Page 5 of this Brief. 
The Fletchers asserted a prescriptive use along the 30 foot 
right-of-way as well as a prescriptive right to a driveway 
crossing the Kimball property to the back ot the Fletcher 
property (R. p 12). 
Prior to the trial, the claims of Fletchers and Sweeneys to 
a portion of the 30 foot right-ot-way strip was resolved by an 
exchange of Quit-Claim Deeds between those parties. The Court 
divided the rest of the disputed property into essentially five 
parcels, though it ignored the claim of the Kimballs to the 30 
foot strip which was divided between Fletchers and Sweeneys by 
means of the deed. Otherwise, the Court awarded two of the 
parcels to Sweeneys and Kimballs as 50% co-tenant owners; two of 
the parcels to Fletchers as 100% owners; and one parcel to 
Kimballs (R. pp 395-397, see diagram on Page 5). 
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The Court also ruled that Kimballs ana Fletchers were co-
tenants but that Fletcher had maintained a prescriptive easement 
over the partnership property for the maintenance of certain 
buildings and a driveway to the rear of his home (R. p 389; F.F. 
10) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was originally brought by Sweeney Land Company to 
quiet title to a 30 toot strip of property to which the 
Plaintiffs received title by a Quit Claim Deed from United Park 
City Mines in 1980 (R. pp 1-3). Fletchers then filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the property by 
adverse possession or enforce other prescriptive rights because 
of a long-term historical use of this right-of-way running east 
from Park Avenue. (R. p 12). Maud and Gilbert Kimball filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim alleging prescriptive use in the 30 toot 
strip and requesting the Court to quiet title in Kimballs to 
certain other adjoining property which, for the purposes of this 
appeal is designated as the Kimball parcel and the Hershiser 
parcel (R. p 18). 
In 1940, Gilbert Kimball purchased the "Kimball parcel1' for 
back taxes, ana he and his wife have continually paid the taxes 
on that piece of property since that time. (Transcript 
(hereinafter "T.") pp 119-121). The taxes were assessed to 
Gilbert Kimball from 1942 to 1976 (T. p 119, F.F. No. 15) at 
which time Gilbert Kimball signed a Quit Claim Deed to himself 
and his wife for the Kimball parcel and the Hershiser parcel (at 
- 6 -
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the suggestion of the Summit County Recorder; Wanda Spriggs) (R. 
p 443 at pp 21-22) . ... 
The plat in the Summit County Recorder's office indicates 
that Gilbert Kimball has paid the real property taxes on those 
two parcels of property (Exs K-12, K-13 and K-14). Gilbert and 
Maud Kimball have occupied the premises continually since 
approximately 1942 and no other person has made any claim to the 
property other than that asserted by Fletcers in this action. 
Robert Kimball died March 20, 1975 and his estate was duly 
probated in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
ot Utah and closed January, 1976. That estate made no mention o£ 
the existence of any ownership interest in the subject property 
(R. P 129). At no time within the last 40 years has Robert 
Kimball or his successors or heirs made any contribution or 
payment towards either the purchase ot this property or the 
taxes, or assert any claim arising from the 1940 deed until Mel 
Fletcher obtained a Quit-Claim Deed from Robert Kimball's widow 
in May of 1983 and asserted a co-tenant interest (R. 440 at p 
46). in property knowing that even the widow "wasn't aware that 
she owned . . ." (R. 400 at p 46). 
The reason the Deed was solicited was because atter it was 
discovered that Robert Kimball's name appeared on the original 
deed issued in the 1940s even though the property was purchased 
by Gilbert Kimball, alone (Ex. K-10)f Melvin Fletcher went to 
the widow or Robert Kimball and obtained the Deed from her. He 
also added the description of additional property known as the 
Hershiser parcel. No consideration passed to Mrs. Kimball in 
May, 1983, for that Quit-Claim Deed (T. p 180). 
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Gilbert Kimball died that same month, May, 1983. 
Immediately thereafter, counsel for Melvin ana Peggy Fletcher, 
Gerald Kingnorn, recorded a document in the Summit County 
Recorder's Otfice known as "Notice of Probate Distribution" (R. p 
128). The description in that document includes both the Kimball 
parcel and the Hershiser parcel. At the time he received the 
deed from Robert Kimball's widow, Melvin Fletcher did not pay any 
sum, whatsoever, for the deed, though he later testified that 
approximately one year later he gave her $10.00 for property he 
offered to buy from Gilbert Kimball tor $60,000 (T. p 175). 
Gilbert Kimoaii's son testitied that Melvin Fletcher had ottered 
to buy this property tor $90,000 - $96,000 from his father and 
mother. (T. p 157). 
On or about July 7, 1983, Kimballs requested leave of the 
Court to amend their pleadings to assert a slander ot title 
action against Fletchers as a result of the filing of the "Notice 
ot Probate Distribution" (R. p 114) and the altered description 
contained in it. That same date the death of Gilbert Kimball was 
duly suggested upon the record in compliance with Rule 25 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. p 117). 
On June 21, 1983 Fletchers had requested leave to amend 
their Answer against Kimballs asserting a co-tenancy as a result 
ot the Quit Claim Deed obtained in May ot 1983 from Robert 
Kimball's widow. 
November 17, 1983 the Estate of Gilbert Kimball again filed 
a Notice ot Death ana Appointment of Personal Representative in 
this action (R. p 169). 
- 8 -
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December 7, 1983/ the District Court denied Kimball's 
request to amend their pleading stating that Fletchers and their 
attorney had an absolute privilege to disparage the title to 
Kimball's property in private litigation (R. pp 171-175). 
March 5, 1984, KimDalls moved the District Court to dismiss 
all claims of ownership to any property by Gilbert Kimball or the 
Estate of Gilbert Kimball since his death had been suggested upon 
the record and no motion to join the Estate had been made as 
provided for by Rule 25 ot the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Kimoalls also moved the Court to dismiss on the grounds that the 
statute of limitations barred all claims by Fletchers (R. p 226). 
On May 29, 1984, the Motion to Dismiss was granted only as 
to the Decedent Gilbert Kimball but denied as to his Estate (R. p 
190) . 
On March 12, 1984 , Elizabeth Kimball, the widow of Robert 
Kimball, filed a Disclaimer with this Court disclaiming any 
interest in the real property which was the subject matter of the 
litigation (R. p 241). The Disclaimer filed by Elizabeth Kimball 
was filed as a result of the request of Gilbert and Maud Kimball 
to reopen the Estate of Robert Kimball and determine whether or 
not he had any interest which passed in the subject property to 
his widow and subsequently to Fletchers. In that proceeding in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State ot Utah, Mel and 
Peggy Fletcher were represented by counsel, Gerald Kinghorn and 
Elizabeth Kimball was represented by Robert Ruggeri. That 
hearing was held on January 18, 1984 and the District Court of 
Salt Lake County denied the Motion to Reopen the Estate (Ex K-
15) . 
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The transcript of the probate hearing was admitted as 
evidence at the trial (Exhibit K-15). In that transcript, 
counsel for Elizabeth Kimball stated: 
"I would like to simply offer one more time that I enter 
an appearance on behalf of Elizabeth Kimball in the 
District Court in Summit County and enter disclaimer of 
any interest coming to her since she is the only person, 
the only litigee, the only devisee is entitled to do the 
entire estate * * *" (emphasis added) 
(Ex K-15 p 21). 
In addition to claiming an interest as partners with 
Kimballs, Mel Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher alleged prescriptive 
rights for a driveway which crossed the property of the Kimballs 
and where two small sheds were placed. Kimballs contend said use 
was permissive and was not therefore hostile to their 
ownership. Mr. Mel Fletcher (T. p 179); Mr. Gilbert Kimball (R. 
p 443 at p 28); Maud Kimoall (T. p 130); Mr. Fletcher1 s brother 
(Ex. 22-K); Mr. Fletcher's sister (Ex. 23-K); Mr. Fletcher's 
father (T. 177) and the Estate of Blanche Fletcher, his mother, 
which owns the contiguous property, (T. p 174) ail stated their 
opinion that all use by the Fletchers was with Gilbert Kimball's 
consent. 
The trial was held September 5, 1985 before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick. At the commencement of the trial, counsel for 
Fletchers stated that the parcel designated as the Hershiser 
piece had been quit-claimed to Sweeneys (T. p 9). Further, 
counsel tor Sweeneys stipulated on the record that Sweeneys made 
no claim to the Hershiser parcel (T. p 7). Even though Sweeney-
stipulated in opening argument, that they made no claim to the 
Hershiser parcel (T. p 7) and that the Defendants, Fletchers, had 
- 10 - . 
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earlier quit-claimed any right in said property to Sweeneys (T. p 
9), the ruling of the Court, from the bench, awarded the 
Hershiser parcel to Sweeney, in spite of their disclaimer of any 
interest and, later, upon the preparation of the Judgment, the 
Hershiser parcel was divided 50% to the Sweeneys and 50% to 
Kimballs (R. pp 395-397). 
GILBERT KIMBALL The deposition of Gilbert Kimball was taken 
February 28, 1983 (R. p 443). Mr. Kimball died in May of 1983, 
the same month that Elizabeth Kimball delivered the Quit-Claim 
Deed to Melvin Fletcher for the Kimball parcel and the Hershiser 
parcel. Because of his death, and no further testimony about his 
brother being on the 1940 deed was available from Gilbert 
Kimball. 
Gilbert Kimball testified that in 1956 the County Recorder 
showed him a plat of his property and it included both the 
Kimball parcel and the Hershiser parcel (G. Kimball Dep. p 28; R. 
p 443) . 
Kimballs and the Fletchers have been long-time family 
friends and neither Mel Fletcher nor anyone else had ever claimed 
to have any ownership of the property (G. Kimball Dep. p 28) and 
Fletcher's father, Roy Fletcher, had asked permisson to use the 
property (T. pp 28, 35) which was freely granted because the 
parties were close, family friends. 
Prior to the institution of the lawsuit, Mel Fletcher and 
his wife had offered to buy the property without any claim for 
ownership or easement (G. Kimball Dep p 28; R. p 443; T. p 179). 
Marion Fletcher, Mel Fletcher's brother, had delivered a 
written statement to Mr. Kimball that the use of the Kimball 
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property by the Fletchers was permissive (Ex. 22-K, Addendum). 
This statement was witnessed by Mr. Fletcher's wite, Nola (G. 
Kimball Depo. p 33; R. 443) and Mel Plecher and his wife always 
had permission to use the property (G. Kimball Dep. pp 56, 57; R. 
p 443) . 
Gilbert Kimball also testitied that his brother, Robert 
Kimball, told him that he had nothing to do with this property in 
Park City (G. Kimball Dep. p 52; R. p 443). 
MELVIN FLETCHER The Kimball property was utilized by Mr. 
Fletcher and his mother for access to the rear of both Mel 
Fletcher's property and the estate property. Mr. Fletcher 
claimed an easement across the Kimball property yet no claim was 
ever asserted by his mother or any other part of the family (T. 
pp 174-176). This was because the Kimbails and Fletchers have 
been lifetime friends and neighbors (T. p 175). 
Mel Fletcher's father freely admitted that the "Kimball 
property" belonged to Maud and Gilbert Kimball (T. p 177) and 
also, Mel Fletcher's brother and sister both acknowledged that 
the property belonged to Maud and Gilbert Kimbail (T. p 178, Ex. 
22-K and 23-K). 
Melvin Fletcher always had permission to use the 
Kimbail/Hershiser property (T. p 179) and he offered to buy the 
property from Gilbert Kimball tor $60,000.00 (R. p 180) to 
$90,000.00 (R. pp 156, 157). When he was unsuccessful in 
purchasing tne property, Melvin Fletcher approached the widow of 
Robert Kimball and obtained a Quit-Claim Deed to the property for 
which he paid nothing (R. p 180). He then asserted a co-tenant 
- 12 -
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interest atter May, 1983. That interest was eventually enforced 
by the Court. 
MAUD KIMBALL Maud Kimball has lived within sight of the 
subject property which is designated as the Kimball-Hershiser 
piece for 60 years (T. p 112). She was personally familiar with 
the fact that there was a fence existed along the nortnern part 
of her property, separating the right-of-way which has been 
called the 30 loot strip (T. pp 116, 117) and the Sweeney 
property. 
KimDails had assumed that they were fee title owners of the 
property. They also thought their payment of taxes for the last 
45 years had acted to extinguish Robert Kimball's name from the 
title because this was done at the insistence ot Robert Kimball 
himself when he said he aid not want to pay the taxes or want 
anything to do with this property (T. p 126). In fact, Robert 
Kimball told Gilbert Kimball he aid not want to pay the taxes and 
wanted nothing to do with the property (T. pp 127, 128). 
No one disputed ownership of the Kimball and Hershiser 
property between 1940 and 1983 (T. p 130) and Robert Kimball had 
instructed Gilbert Kimball to pay the taxes and it would take his 
name off the title (T. p 149). 
Gary Kimball. Gary Kimball testified that Robert Kimball 
told his father, Gilbert Kimball, that he had no interest in the 
Kimball/Hershiser property in 1953 in Park City, Utah (T. pp 154-
156). Also, Gary Kimball was present in the early 1980s or late 
1970s when Mel Fletcher offered to buy the Kimball property tor 
$90,000.00. (T. p 157) . 
- 13 -
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RULING OF THE COURT: The trial was concluded on September 
6, 1985 the Court entered its ruling awarding the property as 
follows (R. p 439, Addendum): 
1. The Hershiser parcel was awarded 100% to Sweeneys. 
2. Fletchers were awarded the 30 foot strip and one-half of 
the Kimball property. 
3. Kimballs were awarded the southern half of the Kimball 
parcel. (Trascript of Court's Ruling, R. p 439). 
4. The rest of the 30 foot right-of-way was not addressed. 
Counsel for Fletchers then prepared the Findings or Fact and 
Judgment in this action and without requesting an amendment of 
judgment or any other appropriate ruling by the Court changed the 
ruling to award property as follows (R. pp 395-397, Addendum): 
1. Hershiser parcel - 50% to Sweeney and 50% to KimDail. 
2. Northly half of the 30 foot right-of-way - 50% to 
Sweeney and 50% to Kimball. 
3 . Southerly half of the 30 foot right-of-way way to 
Fletcher. 
4. Northern half of Kimball property to Fletcher. 
5. Soutnerly half of Kimball property to Kimball. 
Thereafter Sweeneys1 and Kimballs1 Motion to Amend the 
Judgment ana Findings or for New Trial was denied, without 
comment, by Order executed January 13, 1986 (R. p 415). 
The Court also found that the 30 toot strip began at the 
easterly side of Park Avenue and extended in a northerly 
direction for an indefinite distance and description (R. p 
387). The northeasterly boundary of this strip cannot be 
identified (F.F. No. 7, R. p 387). 
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In 1940/ Robert Kimball and Gilbert Kimball purchased the 
Hershiser parcel, but the legal description contained in the Deed 
was incomplete and the property description should have included 
the Hershiser parcel (F.F. No. 8, R. p 388). 
The Plaintitt was on notice ot the claim ot Gilbert and Maud 
Kimball at the time they received the Quit Claim Deed in 1980 and 
the Plaintiff occupied only 15 teet ot the 30 toot strip (F.F. 
No. 9, R. p 389). 
Fletchers have openly, notoriously and adversely used 
approximately the northern halt of the Kimball parcel and the 30 
foot strip (F.F. No. 10, R. p 389). 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball were co-tenants with Robert W. 
Kimball (no ruling as to the Estate ot Gilbert Kimball is made) 
(F.F. No. 14, R. p 391) . 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball have paid all property taxes 
assessed on both the Hershiser and Kimball parcels since 1942 
(F.F. No. lb, R. p 391) and Fletchers owe Kimballs $4r641.66 
being one-half of the property taxes for the last 42 years (F.F. 
No. 15, R. p 391). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court Judge failed to make proper findings 
in accordance with Rule 52 of the Utah Rules ot Civil Procedure 
and otherwise abrogated his responsibility to rule in this case 
by allowing Respondents' counsel to change the ownership ot the 
property distributed by the Court. 
- 15 -
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2. The claims of Sweeney and Fletcher as to the property 
claimed by Kimball are barred by the Statute of Limitations 
because more than seven years elapsed after the probate 
proceeding and prior to the institution of any claim or assertion 
of ownership. This claim is barred by §§ 78-12-6, 78-12-8 and 
78-12-12 U.C.A. (1953). 
3. Any claim of ownership to the property claimed by 
Kimballs is barred by the Doctrines ot Estoppel and Laches 
because Kimballs have been in good faith possession for over 40 
years and no one has challenged their title or occupancy. 
Further, the claimants' predecessors specifically disclaimed any 
interest in the property, took no action to assert any rights in 
it for 43 years and conceded that even they believed the property 
belong to Gilbert and Maud Kimball. 
4. Kimballs acquired title to the property through adverse 
possession in that they had openly possessed the property for 40 
years, paid ail taxes assessed against it and the fact that their 
possession was hostile was of the most obvious and clear 
character to everyone, including the parties to this action. 
5. The District Court was mistaken in deciding that a party 
to private litigation has an absolute privilege to file any 
document he wants and thereby slander or disparage the title to 
the other litigant's property when the recorded document is not a 
lis pendens or otherwise sanctioned or privileged by law. 
6. The claims of Fletchers and Sweeneys against the title 
held by Kimballs is barred by Rule 25 for failure to join the 
Estate as a party within 90 days after the death of Gilbert 
- 16 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kimball was suggested upon the record. The trial court found 
that the Quit-Claim Deed from Gilbert Kimball to he and his wife 
as joint tenants was ineffective to convey the property and, 
therefore, the property claimed by Kimballs in their Counterclaim 
must be quieted to the Estate of Gilbert Kimball. 
7. In the event the trial court's ruling that Fletchers and 
Kimballs are co-tenants is upheld, then Kimballs are entitled to 
one-half of all of the property awarded to Fletchers, including 
the 30 foot strip and a redistribution of the property so that 
they receive their fair share. The trial court allowed counsel 
for the Respondent to divide the property in a manner most 
convenient to his client, resulting in Kimballs being awarded 
interests wnich are divided and have minimum value. Such unequal 
distribution as to percentages ana location constitutes an abuse 
ot discretion. 
I. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ABROGATED HIS RESPONSIBILITY 
BY ALLOWING COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT TO SUBSTITUTE 
COUNSEL'S RULING FOR THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT 
CONTRARY TO RULE 52 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
THE FINDINGS ARE AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY 
Upon conclusion of the evidence, the Court ruled that the 
property in question should be divided upon between the parties 
as set forth at the top of Page 4 of this Brief (R. p 439, 
Addendum). 
Upon completion of the proposed Findings ot Fact and 
Conclusions ot Law and Judgment, counsel tor the Respondent, 
changed the ruling of the Court and awarded ownership of the 
property in question as shown on the bottom diagram on Page 4 of 
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Upon a hearing of the Appellant's Motion to Amend the 
Findings to comply with the ruling of this Court, the Judge 
allowed the Findings and Judgment and thereby permitted the 
Respondents to substitute their judgment for that ot the Court 
without one change or comment (R. pp 414-415, Addendum). 
In Phillips v. Phillips, 171 Colo 127, 464 P.2d (1970) the 
Colorado Supreme Court at page 878 stated: 
"There may be exceptional cases in which such a 
procedure is justified (having both parties submit 
proposed findings for consideration), but they are 
rare. They are certainly not represented by the instant 
case. After taking whatever time was necessary to 
digest the evidence in this case, the trial judge had 
the judicial responsibility to give utterance - solely 
from his own lips, of his views . . . " 
Perhaps the most often cited case in regards to a Judge's 
responsibility to make findings is found in United States v. 
Forness, 125 F.2d 928 (1942), cert, denied 316 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 
1293 (1942) which was cited with approval in U.S. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas. The Court stated at page 942 
"It is sometimes said that the requirement that the 
trial judge file findings of fact is for the convenience 
of the upper courts. While it does serve that end, it 
has a far more important purpose - that of evoking care 
on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts 
for, as every judge knows, to sit down in precise words 
the facts as he finds them is the best way to avoid 
carelessness in the discharge of his duty." 
Not only are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ot Law in 
this case ambiguous and uncertain, they are totally contradictory 
to the actual ruling of the Court (see diagram on Page 4). 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules ot Civil Procedure states: 
"In ail actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . 
. the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A." 
- 18 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By allowing Respondent to unilaterally make their own 
determination of how the property should be partitioned, the 
trial judge has passed the aegis ot his position to the parties. 
Counsel tor Appellants admits that this is a complicated 
case involving several pieces of property and their ownership. 
Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal of this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party." 
Article VIII, § 1: 
"The judicial power ot the state shall be vested in the 
senate sitting as a court ot impeachment, in a Supreme 
Court, in district courts, in justices ofthe peace, and 
such other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, as may 
be established by law.1' 
The trial judge in this action has ceded his office to the 
Respondents by allowing them to divide up the property as they 
choose. Such action renders Appellants redress to the court as 
meaningless and contrary to the rights guaranteed them by the 
Utah Constitution. As Judge Frank said in U.S. v. Forness, 
supra, at Page 943: 
"To ascertain the facts is not a mechanical act, it is a 
difficult art, not a science. It involves skill and 
judgment. As fact findings is a human undertaking, it 
can, of course, never be perfect. For that very reason, 
every effort should be made to render it as adequate as 
it humanly can be." 
It is an art which must be practiced by the judge, not the 
litigants. 
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The contusion ana contradiction which are found in the 
Judgment also require reversal. In addition to the discrepancy 
above, the Judgment awarded an interest in the Hershiser parcel 
to Sweeney who had disclaimed any interest in it. Counsel fo 
Sweeney stated at Page 7 ot the Transcript, "The Plaintiff makes 
no claim to that property (Hershiser)." The Judgment also 
determines that Fletchers and Kimballs are co-tenants 
(Conclusions of Law No. 3, R. p 393, Addendum) yet goes on to 
find that Fletchers1 use of the property is prescriptive as 
against Kimballs (F.F. No 10, R. p 387, Addendum). The Court 
completely ignores the case ot Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 
(Utah, 1982) requiring unequivocal notice to a co-tenant of 
adverse claims. (This case is addressed later, so omitted 
here). In Sillman v. Powell, Utah, 642 P.2d 388, 391 (1982), 
this Court stated: 
"We are unable to determine whether any ot the foregoing 
assignments of error have any validity because the 
findings ot fact are couched in ambiguous, indefinite 
and conclusory terms that do not alow us to determine 
whether the trial judge correctly applied the law to the 
facts." 
The ambiguity and contradictions in this case also require 
reversal. 
II. 
SWEENEY AND FLETCHER'S CLAIMS TO THE KIMBALL/HERSHISER 
PARCEL ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
§§78-12-6, 78-12-8 AND 78-12-12 U.C.A. (1953) 
The claim ot Mel Fletcher for title as a co-tenant to the 
property arising trom the Deed from Elizabeth Kimball in May ot 
1983 is barred because it was not commenced within seven years of 
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the Decree ot Distribution ot the Estate ot Robert Kimball. The 
Decree ot Distribution (R. pp 147, 148, Addendum) was filed 
January, 1976, more than seven years prior to the execution of 
the Quit-Claim Deed trom Elizabeth Kimball to Fletcher in May of 
1983. In Parr v. Zions First National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 
P.2d 461 (1962) the heirs ot a deceased sought to quiet title 
more than seven years after the Decree of Distribution, 
Excluding the issue addressed in Parr as to whether or not the 
Statute ot Limitations was tolled during minority, that case is 
strikingly similar to the one now betore this Court. A complaint 
in that action alleged that respondents had acquired title to 
property by adverse possession for over 15 years and appellant's 
counterclaim alleged their interest arose as heirs of the 
deceased. 
The Court upheld Summary Judgment that the claim by the 
heirs was barred by the Statute of Limitations §§78-12-6, 78-12-8 
and 78-12-12, U.C.A. (1953) (reproduced in Addendum) because more 
than seven years had run since the Decree ot Distribution. The 
Court stated at Page 406: 
"* * * the facts in this case are that a guardian was 
appointed tor appellants when distribution was made to 
it ot appellant's interest in all the property which 
descended to them in their father's estate. This 
guardian had possession or the right to possession in 
the property tor more than the required seven years. In 
Dignon v. Nelson, this Court held that where the statute 
ot limitations has run against the guardian, the minor 
heirs are likewise barred, just as we have held that 
when the administrator is barred, the minor heirs of 
decedent were barred and for the same reasons." 
Because neither the estate, the heir, Elizabeth Kimball, Mel 
Fletcher nor Sweeneys commenced any proceeding for more than 
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seven years subsequent to the Decree of Distribution, the claim 
is barred by the Statute of Limitations as -against Kimbails. 
III. 
THE CLAIMS OF THE SWEENEYS AND FLETCHERS 
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AND ESTOPPEL 
BECAUSE FOR OVER 40 YEARS NO CLAIM WAS ASSERTED 
It is respectfully submitted to this Court that there is no 
doubt in the record that Maud and Gilbert Kimball believed in 
good faith that they were sole owners of the property designated 
as the Hershiser/Kimball parcel. Up to the time the name of 
Robert Kimball was discovered on the old Deed in 1983, not one 
person ever challenged their right to possession or ownership of 
this property upon which they faithfully paid the taxes. 
Gilbert Kimball, Maud Kimball and Gary Kimball all testified 
that they heard Robert Kimball tell them years ago that he wanted 
nothing to do with the property and it was theirs, and they 
should do whatever they wanted to take his name off it. One must 
consider this statement in light of the tact that in the 1940s, 
50s and 60s Park City was a desereted town. Even the County 
records demonstrated the property belonged to Kimbails (Addendum) 
when Gilbert went to the County in 1956 (G. Kimball Depo pp 21, 
25; Exs K-12, K-13 and K-14). 
The record amply indicates that the Fletchers believed the 
Kimbails owned the property since they attempted to purchase it 
from them (Fletcher, T. p 180) and only when that was 
unsuccessful did they assert various easements and ownership 
interests. 
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Mr, Fletcher's father, Roy, as well as his father and sister 
knew that any use ot the property was permissive. This was 
because ail of these parties were residents of Park City and good 
friends until Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher saw a way to take advantage 
of that relationship, for profit. 
In addition to Fletchers lack ot diligence, neither his 
deceased brothers nor heirs ever asserted any claim or rights in 
over 40 years. In 1976 Robert Kimball died and no mention ot 
this property was made in his estate or Will. Counsel tor 
Kimballs asked to reopen Robert Kimball's estate to determine 
what, if any, ownership interest Robert Kimball had in this 
property and the attorney for Elizabeth Kimball, Robert Ruggeri, 
stated in court that they would disclaim any interest coming to 
her (emphasis added) in open court. Fletchers were represented 
by Mr. Kinghorn at that hearing (Addendum) and Judge Daniels did 
not reopen the Estate in reliance on that disclaimer. 
In Papnikoias Brothers v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center, Utah, 
535 P.2d 1256 (1975) this Court addressed the elements of laches 
in deciding a one year delay was not significant to invoke the 
equitable powers of the Court. 
This Court stated at Page 1259: 
"The benefits ot balancing the doctrine of equitities or 
relative hardship, is reserved for the innocent 
defendant, who proceed without knowledge or warning that 
he is encroaching upon another's property rights 
At Page 1260 it was stated that the Doctrine of Laches requires: 
"1. The lack of deligence on the part ot the 
plaintiffs. 
2. An injury to defendant owing to such lack ot 
deligence. 
' . ' ' - 23 -
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Although lapse ot time is an essential part of laches, 
the length of time must depend on the circumstances o£ 
each case, where the propriety of refusing a claim is 
equally predicated upon the gravity of the prejudice 
suffered by defendant and the length of plaintiff's 
delay." 
Mrs. Kimball is having her assets of a lifetime stripped from her 
on technicalities which, if not unlawful, are immoral and require 
imposition ot this equitable doctrine. 
IV. 
KIMBALLS HAVE ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE 
KIMBALL/HERSHISER PARCEL BY ADVERSE POSSESSION 
It is undisputed that Gilbert and Maud Kimball paid the real 
property taxes assessed on the property from at least 1942 (Ex K-
10; F.F. No. 15, R. p 391). The tax sale record demonstrates 
sale to Gilbert J. Kimball alone (attached to Ex K-10, 
Addendum). The Summit County Assessor's plat showed the property 
SA348 assessed to Gilbert Kimball in the early 1950s (Ex K-12) as 
well as currently (Ex K-14, Addendum). 
Robert Kimball told Gilbert Kimball that "he had nothing to 
do with this property. He refused to pay any part of the taxes 
on it, so we let the property go to taxes. And we bought it back 
in my name." (Dep. G. Kimball, R. 443 p 53). In fact, it was 
Robert Kimball who instructed Gilbert Kimball on the manner in 
which to get Robert Kimball's name off the property (R. pp 126-
128) . 
Possession and use of the property has been maintained by 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball as owners continuously since 1947 and 
such possession has been open, notorious and hostile to the 
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entire world (Dep. G. Kimball pp 7-26, Addendum). There is no 
dispute that all real estate taxes assessed against the property 
were paid by Gilbert and Maud Kimball alone and that no other 
party contributed in any way to the payment of those taxes prior 
to the commencement of this action. 
In the recent decision of Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 
(Utah, 1982) this Court established the very strict standard when 
a party is claiming adverse possession against a co-tenant and 
stated at Page 589, "stated another way, the claimant's conduct 
must give notice ot his claim to his co-tenant in some clear, 
unequivocal manner". it is submitted to this Court that the 
standards set forth in olwell are satisfied in all respects to 
extinguish any claim to ownership by Robert Kimball and Fletchers 
as a result ot the Quit-Claim Deed from Elizabeth Kimball in May 
of 1983. They simply desereted the property 44 years ago. 
V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
A PARTY TO LITIGATION HAS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE 
TO DISPARAGE ANOTHER'S PROPERTY" 
The Appellant's attorney recorded a document in the Summit 
County Recorder's office known as "Notice of Probate 
Distribution" which described the original Kimball parcel, the 30 
foot strip adjacent to it, and the parcel they have designated at 
the Hershiser piece. visually the piece included all property 
within these boundaries: 
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That document was recorded tor the purpose of aftecting or 
clouding the title to the property involved in this litigaton. 
The District Court refused to allow Appellants to assert a claim 
o£ slander of title and would not allow the pleadings to be 
amended on the basis ot absolute privilege (R. p 190). 
In her deposition, Elizabeth Kimball, the widow who deeded 
the property to Mr. Fletcher in May of 1983, stated (R. 442 p 
13) : 
"Question: (By Mr. Felton) Alright, now, did Mr. 
Fletcher pay you anytning for signing the Deed? 
Answer: No, he did not." 
At pages 14 and 15: 
"Question: Okay, had you ever heard prior to Mr. 
Fletcher calling you that this property had Robert's 
name on it? 
Answer: No. 
Question: You didn't in fact know anything about this 
property, did you, until Mr. Fletcher called you 
otherwise regarding ownership? 
Answer: No. Other than, as I say, when I was married a 
little building was there and we stored stutt in it, and 
Bob was suppose to have half of it. 
Question: This is the Decree ot Distribution from your 
late husband's estate? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And the property that is reflected on the 
Quit-Claim Deed, Exhibit 1, does not appear in this? 
Answer: I understand that. 
Question: Was that because you didn't claim any 
interest at that time? 
Answer: That's right. 
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Question: Have you ever claimed interest in this 
property? 
Answer: No." 
It is submitted that there was sufficient basis to assert a 
cause of action for slander or disparagement of title for and on 
the basis that the document which was recorded by Flechers is not 
sanctioned or authorized by Statute or otherwise and the Estate 
never claimed to own it. 
It must be emphasized that no Lis Pendens was filed by 
Fletchers and the "Notice of Probate Distribution" (Addendum) is 
not such an instrument as is contemplated by §78-40-2 U.C.A. 
1953. The District Court ruled that there is an absolute 
privilege, in private litigation, to slander or disparage 
another's property and that Hansen v. Kohler. 55, P.2d 186 (Utah, 
1976) did not just apply to tiling a Lis Pendens. 
This ruling is absolutely contrary to the law as explained 
by this Court in Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Ut. 453, 235 P.2d 510 
(1951). The offending document is one invented by Resondents and 
filed to "affect" the title of property in litigation. Even an 
innocent filing without privilege or right is slanderous, Olsen, 
supra. 
The ruling must be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial to allow Appellants an opportunity to present their claims. 
VI. 
THE CLAIMS OF FLETCHERS AND SWEENEY ARE 
BARRED BY RULE 25, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The trial judge ruled that Maud and Gilbert Kimball could 
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not rely on title according to the deeds between themselves in 
1976 and 1977 and the description was in error (Transcript Court 
Ruling p 5, Addendum). Title to Kimballs, therefore, must vest 
in Gilbert Kimball since the Quit-Claim Deeds between he and his 
wife were nullities. Since the Quit-Claim Deed could not pass 
"after-acquired title", Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 U. 262, 186 
P.2d 965 (1947) there could be no joint tenancy and ail property 
belongs to the Estate of Gilbert Kimball. 
As stated, Gilbert Kimball died in May, 1983. His death was 
duly suggested upon the record on two occasions (R. pp 117, 118; 
R. pp 229, 230) in compliance with Rule 25(a)(1) ot the Utah 
Rules ot Civil Procedure (Addendum) which states that unless the 
motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days, the 
action shall be dismissed. Since the joint tenancy was not 
created, the claims against Gilbert Kimball should have been 
dismissed. Appellants1 Motion to Dismiss on this basis was 
denied (R. pp 226-228). 
Rule 25 requires this matter be remanded with instructions 
to quiet title to the property described in Kimballs' 
Counterclaim to the estate of Gilbert Kimball. 
VII. 
IF FLETCHERS AND KIMBALLS ARE CO-TENANTS, 
THEN, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
PARTITIONING THE PROPERTY 
As stated earlier in this brief, the trial judge allowed the 
Respondents to alter the judgment of the Court in the 
distriDution ot the ownership of the property. 
- 28 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This abrogation of duty resulted in the Respondents 
preparing the Judgment so that they received title to the 
property as they wanted and left the property retained by Kimball 
divided and unuseable (See diagram on p 4). 
The importance ot this distribution is that if the Fletchers 
and Kimballs are co-tenants, as asserted by Respondents (which 
Appellant disputes) , then Kimballs are entitled to their co-
tenant interest in tne 30 foot strip, all the way to Park 
Avenue. This entitlement is not addressed by the Court, 
apparently for the reason that Fletchers and Sweeney quit-claimed 
one-half of their portion of that right-of-way among themselves 
prior to trial* 
Further, since as part ot that pre-trial agreement, 
Fletchers quit-claimed Parcel A (Hershiser) on the diagram on 
Page 4 ot this Brief to Sweeneys and Sweeneys disclaimed any 
interest to that property in their opening statement, that Parcel 
A must be awarded to Kimballs free and clear of the interest of 
the other litigants. 
It the Court upholds the existence ot a co-tenancy between 
Kimballs and Fletchers, then this case must be remanded for the 
trial court to establish what property was held as co-tenants at 
the time ot trial and to equitably partition that property among 
the co-tenants in accordance with their interest. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Appellants request this Court that this case be 
remanded tor a new trial or that title to the following property 
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be quieted in the Estate of Gilbert Kimball for the reasons 
stated herein. 
2. The following property description constitutes the 
property shown on Page 5 of the Brief as the "Gilbert Kimball 
property" and the "Hershiser property claimed by Gilbert Kimball 
only" and more particular described as: 
Beginning at a point North 23° 38' West 85.97 feet and 
North 33° 25' West 36.70 feet from the Southeast corner 
of Block 7, Amended Plat of Park City and Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and running thence South 61° 10' West 73.16 
feet; thence North 28° 50' West 128.59 feet; thence 
North 61° 101 East 33.90 feet; Thence North 28° 50' West 
30 feet; thence North 64° ll1 East 17 feet; thence South 
43° 131 East 56.50 feet; thence South 33° 25' East 
103.30 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. Appellant Kimball moves this case be remanded ror the 
trial court to reconsider the distribution of the property so 
that separate parcels which are contiguous to each other and 
which brings the greatest economic benefit to each of the parties 
be addressed rather than allowing Respondents to pick choose the 
parcel which they think would be of the greatest benefit to them 
and which would result in an economic loss to Appellants. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29th day of September, 1986. 
(UtM-
Robert Felton 
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